This joint contribution between Syrians for Truth and Justice, Pax, Bell – Civil Waves, Synergy Association for Victims, Coalition of Civil Society Organizations in North and East Syria, Humanitarian and Development Cooperation, Malva Organization for Arts, Culture and Learning and the Platform of Civil Society Organizations in North and East Syria, seeks to shed light on the main causes behind the acute and ongoing water crisis in northeast Syria, and to draw the attention of the relevant UN special procedures to that crisis and the repercussions on the population, including Internally displaced persons, violating their right to safe drinking water, health services and food, for which several parties to the Syrian conflict bear primary responsibility.
The undersigned organizations of this complaint call on the United Nations to take the necessary measures in order to find an urgent and sustainable solution to the water crisis in northeast Syria, taking into account the facts contained in this paper and the attached joint recommendations.
1. Boot:
The intersection of natural factors such as drought and lack of rainfall with illegal practices by local and international actors involved in the Syrian conflict has led to severe water scarcity, ultimately depriving communities in the region of their right to access and adequate and safe water. This right was affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 64/292, recognizing that “the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation is a human right and a prerequisite for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights.” [1]
In turn, the Human Rights Council enshrined this right in its resolution 15/9, explaining that this right “derives from the right to an adequate standard of living, and is inextricably linked to the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, as well as the right to life and human dignity.”
2. Background:
The northeastern Syrian sector relies on three sources of water, whether for drinking, domestic, agricultural or other uses. In addition to rainwater and groundwater, rivers have historically been considered the backbone of life in the region, and this description is specific to the Euphrates River alone today, after the Khabur River waters, mainly seasonal, receded and the rest of it has been cut off over the past few years. These water sources serve local communities and internally displaced people, covering the needs of an estimated 4,800,000 beneficiaries,[2] including 655,000 IDPs. [3]
In 2023, Hasakah governorate recorded rainfall rates estimated to be 60% lower than the average documented over the past three years,[4] in line with the Global Drought Monitor (GDO) drought alert for eastern Syria in April 2021; in April 2021, Hassakeh governorate recorded a sharp decrease compared to the long-term monthly average (80 mm) calculated between 1981 and 2010. [5]
These percentages warn that the region will witness an increase in droughts and their intensity, bringing with them more challenges for the population and the agricultural sector, especially as rainfall is also responsible for groundwater recharge and main/seasonal rivers; years of hostilities in the region have contributed to the intensification of climate change, as the increase in greenhouse gas emissions has fostered local warming and trapping rain in clouds. [6]
In conjunction with the drop in rainfall in Hassakeh, the entire sector recorded a significant decline in groundwater levels, with data collected from November 2021 to October 2022 showing that some areas of the Strip experienced levels five times lower than normal, compared to the long-term average. [7] Droughts are behind this decline, as groundwater has dwindled as rainfall decreases and consumption of its reserves has increased.
In late 2022, local authorities in the area prevented residents from digging wells, in order to preserve groundwater, without providing a sustainable alternative other than tanker water, which beneficiaries complain is distributed unfairly. [8]
The water crisis had negative repercussions on the agriculture, livestock and energy sectors, as statistics collected during 2021 indicate that the percentage of cultivated land declined to only 53%, due to the weakness of water resources and the migration of farmers to their lands, while the decline in the agricultural sector had an impact on livestock, as the percentage of livestock breeding decreased by 39% in 2020 compared to 2008, due to the difficulty of securing fodder and veterinary medicines. The decline in the level of the Euphrates River has also had catastrophic consequences for the output of hydroelectric plants, as power generation capacity has shrunk by more than 66%, and the average has decreased from 415 MW in 2020 to 141 MW in 2021. [9]
These natural factors, and the resulting water scarcity, have a profound impact on the lives of the residents of the region, as the absence or absence of water services has made the region a hotbed of diseases, especially in the absence of the required support and the lack of hesitation of some parties to the conflict from using water as a weapon at the most critical times, as happened during the Corona pandemic period.
In November 2022, Human Rights Watch called on all parties to the conflict to guarantee the right to clean water and health for all in Syria, documenting the role of the Turkish authorities in exacerbating the acute water crisis that is believed to have led to the spread of the deadly cholera epidemic across Syria and its spread to neighboring countries. Turkish authorities have not ensured sufficient water flow upstream towards the Syrian part of the Euphrates River, nor a continuous supply of water from the Alok plant, a vital source of water. [10]
Earlier, in March 2020, the organization highlighted the use of “water as a weapon” by parties to the conflict, after the Turkish authorities stopped pumping water from the Alouk plant several times since the beginning of the year. “The failure of the Turkish authorities to ensure adequate water supply to Kurdish-controlled areas in northeast Syria harms the ability of humanitarian organizations to equip vulnerable communities to protect them, in light of the spread of the new coronavirus that causes the global COVID-19 pandemic,” the organization said, stressing that the Turkish authorities should make every effort to resume the supply of water from the plant. [11]
This correspondence will mainly address the current situation of the Alok water station, the Euphrates and Khabur rivers, briefly noting the factors of the water crisis related to it, which cannot be separated from the context of the armed conflict, which has been going on in Syria for more than 12 years.
In addition, the intervention will include an overview of the situation of some informal camps in northeast Syria, which are prevented from safe water by the obstacle of “official recognition”, as well as the negative repercussions of the water crisis on the health of the region’s residents, especially as they face possible cholera waves.
3. Alouk water cut more than 36 times since 2019:
On 6 June 2023, the water of the Alouk station in the countryside of Ras al-Ain/Serekaniye was cut off again until it was gradually out of service, bringing the number of cuts to 36 times since October 2019,[12] the month in which the area was under joint control between the Syrian armed opposition factions and the Turkish army, as the two sides did not hesitate to cut off the plant’s water despite the fact that it is the only source of drinking water for about 800,000 people in Hasakah. In addition to being the main source of water trucking to Al-Hol, Arisha / Al-Sadd and Al-Tuina (Wacho Kani) camps, which are home to tens of thousands of internally displaced people from different governorates and regions of Syria. It was documented that the station stopped working completely for long periods ranging from four days to a continuous month, in addition to other frequent interruptions due to electrical and maintenance-related failures. [13]
In addition to cutting off water, the parties to the conflict in the region used the plant as leverage to reach an “electricity for water” agreement during 2022; the Autonomous Administration and Syrian government bodies (who share control of the city of Hasakah) tried to reactivate the plant, with the help of the Russian military leadership, which intervened to urge Turkish forces to operate the plant. However, the latter stipulated the maintenance of the Mabrouka power station west of Ras al-Ain/Serê Kaniyê, and feeding it with electricity from the Tishreen Dam, which is jointly managed by the government and the administration, in exchange for operating the Alouk station. [14] The purpose of the maintenance request was to supply power to areas under the control of Turkish-backed factions from the Mabrouka power plant,[15] which was still under government and administration control as part of the Russian-Turkish deal concluded in December 2019. [16]
4. Euphrates River:
Rivers remain at the heart of the water crisis, as Syria as a whole, and its northeastern regions, depend on rivers originating from outside the country, especially the Euphrates River, whose waters are shared with Turkey and then Iraq.
Syria’s dependence on the Euphrates River is 72.36%, making it water-independent and vulnerable to instability and degradation of its ecosystems, which is happening now. [17] As the water levels of the Euphrates River are linked to climate changes in Syria and Turkey, to be affected by the decline in rainfall rates witnessed by the latter, the river catches most of its water from rain in the Armenian highlands in Turkey, while it is estimated that the river water level declined by a sixth by 2010, also under the weight of droughts and increasing use. [18] However, the use cannot be separated from the agreements that regulate partner countries’ shares of the river and the nature of these agreements, which take the form of open negotiations without formal binding frameworks. [19]
In 1987, Syria and Turkey signed a “Protocol on Matters of Economic Cooperation”, Article VI of which Turkey pledged to allow the entry of more than 500 m3 per second annually into Syria during the filling period of the “Ataturk reservoir”, and to compensate for any monthly decrease from the agreed rate in the following month;[20] but this amount fell to less than half, reaching at certain periods to 200 m3 per second;[21] where the water level of the Tishreen Dam on the river fell by five meters in 2021, amid fears that it will drop to the “dead level”, that is, out of service completely, while experts attributed this decline to the huge agricultural projects launched by Turkey, warning that “drought is inevitably coming” in Syria. [22]
Studies show that at least 40% of the Euphrates’ flow has been lost due to overexploitation of the river’s water since 1972, and that natural Euphrates imports upstream will halve by 2040, due to the acceleration of the executive work of Turkish projects in southeastern Anatolia. [23]
5. Khabur River:
While the Euphrates Agreement between the two countries has not been updated due to Turkey’s cessation of negotiations in 2011, the Khabur River,[24] the largest tributary of the Euphrates, lacks any special agreements that regulate its quotas or protect beneficiaries’ access to its waters.
In May 2021, the river, located 80 kilometers northwest of the city of Hasakah, was completely cut off after Turkish-backed Syrian armed opposition groups built three irregular dams (berms) downstream in the Ras al-Ain/Serekaniye area. [25]
The construction of these dams has deprived tens of thousands of farmers of the ability to irrigate their land, especially in villages near the Tal Tamr area. Partner organizations were able to document the impact of more than 46,000 dunums of agricultural land in the Tal Tamr area alone as a result of the cutting off of the river, which led their owners to either abandon the cultivation of a number of crops or reduce the cultivated areas to reduce alternative irrigation costs through the use of well water that requires diesel engines and artesian pumps. In addition, livestock owners were deprived of the benefit of the pastoral areas that grow on the edges of the river when it flowed and from watering thirsty livestock.
In order to obtain up-to-date information on the status of the river and the earth mounds constructed, partner organizations contacted a civil engineer and consultant in water studies and dam construction, who said:
“Turkey released the river water after the February 2023 earthquake, in order to relieve pressure on the dams it built on its tip of the river, and to avoid any damage that the earthquake may cause to its dams.”
The source noted that the dams are the continuation of a set of practices that Turkey had started last decade, all of which contributed to the drying up of the Khabur on the Syrian side, including drilling wells in the plain area extending between the edges of Mount Taurus and the border with Syria, and the use of water in the cultivation of the region, as these wells were drilled in the reservoir of the river extending between the Syrian and Turkish sides, although the river feeds on 18 springs, all in Syria.
The source added that the flow of the river decreased from about 60 m 3 per second during the sixties to 40 cubic meters in the seventies, and so on until it dried up at the beginning of the nineties, adding: “During the past years, Turkey cut off the water of the streams and small rivers permanent and temporary flow that used to reach the Syrian side, and it has contributed, along with low rainfall rates, to the transformation of stability areas in the Jazira region into semi-desert areas, where drought reached the first stability zone. Adjacent to the border with Turkey, crop production in this region has declined in recent years, although it was one of the most fertile areas in the Syrian island. These changes carry the threat of mass displacement of the population of this area as a result of drought, declining water levels and rainfall.”
6. Unrecognized camps:
Gazans’ access to essential clean water allocations is undermined by two additional factors that cannot be ignored. First, the destruction of infrastructure, including water networks, as a result of military operations;[26] Second, the UN’s failure to recognize a number of camps for displaced people in the area, which keeps them on the sidelines of water assistance and exacerbates their vulnerability in the face of the water crisis. According to information obtained by partner organizations, there are six unrecognized camps in various areas of northeast Syria; two in Hassakeh, two in Raqqa, and two in Manbij.
Partner organizations contacted two internally displaced people living in the informal “Tal al-Samman” camp, in the countryside of Raqqa, the two sources confirmed that the camp suffers from the amount and type of water provided, as each four or five families, regardless of the number of their members, share 1,000 liters per day, which are rented from a wheel outside the camp and filled in barrels inside, and the distributed water is often turbid and undrinkable, as “the sterilization and filtration process is not good.”
The two sources added that the camp’s families suffer from intestinal infections and diarrhea frequently, especially during the summer period.
The testimonies of internally displaced people living in Serekaniye/Al-Tala’i camp in Hasakah, where camp residents suffer from a lack of water distributed, 100 liters per day per tent or family, as well as sanitation, also intersected, with one of the sources telling partner organizations: “We suffer from sanitation more than we suffer from the problem of drinking water, as there are no sewage channels; each toilet is discharged through an artistic chamber, which is emptied from time to time. We suffer from the spread of diseases due to the lack of sanitation.”
7. Health repercussions of the water crisis:
It should be noted that the tragic manifestations of the water crisis, with its causes related to natural or conflict-related factors, have reached life-threatening levels, as the year 2022 witnessed more than 15,483 cases of cholera, of whom 28 died, in northeastern Syria, while the latest updates recorded that the numbers reached 35,745 infections in the region.
Many have attributed the spread of cholera across Syria, particularly in its northeastern sector, to the water crisis, including the low level of the Euphrates River,[27] and the population’s dependence on alternative water that lacks safety standards.
A cholera patient, a resident of a displacement camp in al-Hasakah, told a local Syrian organization involved in this correspondence:[28]
“The water entering the camp through tankers/private by some individuals, is not safe to drink and is not subject to any health monitoring, and has injured 11 people from our family alone, including my mother and brother.”
Local reports indicate that the region has all the factors that pave the way for the recurrence of the cholera crisis in the future, especially as the water level of the Euphrates River will continue to fall, amid difficulties in finding a long-term solution. [29]
Analyses of annual flow scenarios have concluded that with the continuation of the average flow scenario of 200 m3 per second for more than one year and 105 days, an environmental and health disaster will occur in all settlement communities in the Middle Euphrates (Syria) and Lower (Iraq) basins, especially the human concentrations scattered on the banks of the Euphrates River. [30]
In 2020, the water cuts of the Alouk station coincided with the Corona pandemic, which deprived the residents of the area of one of the most important means of protection from infection, as a doctor spoke to a local Syrian organization participating in this correspondence at the time, saying:[31]
“The lack of water has negatively affected the personal hygiene of people and families, as well as the cleanliness and sterilization of health centers and hospitals, which poses a serious threat to people’s lives, in light of the spread of the novel coronavirus.”
8. The water crisis has no limits:
It should be noted that this intervention was specific to northeastern Syria, due to the difficulty of addressing the water crisis throughout the country, as water challenges have a life-threatening impact in the northwestern regions of the country. For example, on June 23, 2023, a local Syrian organization participating in this correspondence monitored a demonstration under the slogan “The door is thirsty”, organized by the residents of the city of Al-Bab, in which they called on the international community to pressure the Syrian government to reactivate the water pumping of the Ain al-Bayda station. Until 2017, residents of al-Bab city and the towns of Bza’a and Qabasin, north of Aleppo, relied mainly on the water of the Ain al-Bayda station, which the Syrian government cut off allocations from a year after it took control of the village of Ain al-Bayda, in the countryside of Koris, in 2016.
The station is 16 kilometers from the city of Al-Bab, which has drawn water through a waterway that transports its share of the Khafsa water pumping station on the Euphrates River. The severance was followed by a “humanitarian crisis”,[32] as the city was already suffering from damage to infrastructure, including water and sewage networks, that accompanied military operations[33] against IS between 2016 and 2017.
A resident of the city told one of the partner organizations in this correspondence that the local council in al-Bab launched a project to feed the people with water after cutting off the station’s water, as the project relied on 13 underground wells, which began to dry up some time ago. The source added, “The water that reaches the city of Al-Bab from transport vehicles or the city council is not treated or sterilized with chlorine, which leads to daily poisoning. Cutting off water to the city of al-Bab was economically devastating as it was also used for agriculture, and not a few of the city’s residents are farmers.”
9. Legal opinion:
The legal framework relating to the non-navigational uses of international watercourses has evolved since the nineteenth century into what has become a section of international water law. The 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (the Watercourses Convention) is the only international convention establishing principles and rules for cooperation among States on the management, use, distribution and protection of international watercourses. Unfortunately, Turkey did not accede to this agreement, which entered into force in 2014, and has expressed multiple objections to it and voted against it in the United Nations General Assembly. However, there are several other international legal instruments, some of which are considered a reflection of customary international law that regulate international relations with regard to international watercourses. The state of armed conflict in Syria since 2012 and Turkey’s involvement in it require the enforcement of the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law, in addition to the provisions of international human rights law.
First: Relevant basic principles and rules in international water law:
The principle of equitable and reasonable use: It is considered one of the most prominent international norms on the management of international watercourses. Although the principle of state sovereignty gives states the right to use shared freshwater within their territory, this requires doing so fairly and reasonably vis-à-vis other states. [34] The continued practice of States as well as numerous decisions and opinions of international and national courts indicate that this principle is considered a binding international custom regardless of Turkey’s non-accession to most international and regional treaties governing international watercourse issues. For example, the International Court of Justice has held that the (former) Czechoslovakia has deprived Hungary of its right to a fair and reasonable share in the natural resources of the Danube River, by imposing Czechoslovakia’s control over this common resource, and the continuing effects of diversion of these waters on the ecosystem of regions in Hungary. The Court considered that Czechoslovakia had failed to respect the principle of proportionality imposed in international law in the fair and reasonable use of watercourses. [35]
The principle of equitable and reasonable use stems from the principle of sovereign equality of States, and therefore no State participating in watercourses has the right to claim superiority over the rights of other States regardless of the location or source of such watercourses. Because equity does not mean quantitative equality, fulfilling this principle and achieving optimal use among countries involved in watercourses requires flexibility and periodic adaptation to many changing conditions and conditions such as geographical, climatic, social, economic and other conditions. [36]
In the same vein, countries other than the upstream country cannot claim more quantitative rights to water than the upstream country merely because, for example, it has preceded the upstream country in developing water use programs, because such a claim would lead to an unfair and unreasonable use of the upstream country when it develops similar programs and projects appropriate to its needs. [37]
Accordingly, no State involved in watercourses can invoke a fait accompli to acquire the right to international watercourses, but must continue to enforce the principle of equitable and reasonable use through continuous review and evaluation because changing circumstances require adjustments in use,[38] The armed conflict in Syria and the country’s diverse control dynamics in conjunction with the challenges of climate change may be among the clearest examples of this type of control imposed on Turkey. Review and evaluation.
The principle of non-harm: It is considered one of the provisions of customary international law that applies to international water law, in addition to being applicable to all aspects of international law and international relations. [39] This principle can be explained by saying that States can use what they own without causing harm to what other States own. This principle is closely linked to the rules of good neighborliness[40] and non-abuse of rights. [41] According to this principle, states have a duty to act, not to result, i.e. they must take all reasonable measures not to cause significant harm. To do so, States must take into account the facts and facts in each case in accordance with the principle of due diligence. This principle applies to both upstream and watercourse States.
Procedural obligations: States involved in watercourses must adhere to a set of measures that ensure the enforcement of their other obligations on the one hand, and lead to the avoidance of disputes between States on the other. The most important of these obligations are the duty to notify in advance, the duty to exchange information and data, the duty to consult with potentially affected States, the duty to conduct an environmental impact assessment, and the duty to cooperate. [42] To illustrate the importance of these procedural duties, a State cannot implement the principle of equitable and reasonable use without sharing with other affected States the necessary data and information necessary for all Parties and consulting with them for the continuous assessment of water uses, taking into account all factors affecting their interests.
The International Court of Justice has noted the duty to assess environmental impact as a customary rule of international law and has determined that States must undertake such an assessment “when there is a risk that the proposed activity will cause an adverse impact in the transboundary context, in particular on shared resources”. [43]
The environmental consequences of the measures taken by the States involved in the watercourses should not be limited to assessing the environmental impact on the other States concerned, but should go beyond them to take into account environmental considerations in general, including, for example, in the Syrian case, the effects of groundwater, soil pollution, desertification, etc.
Vital human needs: It should not be relied upon that the texts governing international water law do not literally address individual rights that justify the omission of these rights. The rationale behind the principle of equitable and reasonable use itself and the provisions of international water law governing the management and distribution of water among countries are that they themselves aim to respond to vital human needs and must therefore be prioritized over any other uses. [44]
Second: The legal framework related to the Syrian conflict and Turkish involvement in it:
Occupation: International humanitarian law provides that when a state exercises effective control over part of another state’s territory, it is subject to the laws of occupation, including the obligation to provide for the basic needs of the population, including water. Whether the state exercises such control is a matter of fact and is not determined by the opinions of the parties involved. [45] According to international law governing occupation, an occupying power may not arbitrarily use the natural resources of occupied territories for its own ends, but can use them to the extent necessary for the current administration of the occupied territories and to respond to the basic needs of the population. [46] Under no circumstances shall the occupying power exploit the population, resources, or other assets in the areas under its control for the benefit of its land or population. [47] Accordingly, in addition to the above international water law, Turkey’s exploitation of the state of occupation and effective control over Syrian territory with its water resources and some vital water facilities to serve the ends and purposes of its lands and water resources on the one hand, or for other political purposes, including bargaining with other parties to the armed conflict, such as the Syrian government or the Autonomous Administration on the other hand, is a clear violation of this principle.
Relevant provisions of international humanitarian law: All parties involved in the armed conflict must mitigate the negative impact on civilians’ right to water access even if water infrastructure is not a deliberate target of attack. [48] In addition to negative obligations on parties to the conflict, such as not targeting water as a civilian object indispensable to the survival of the population, international law prohibits the use of water and its infrastructure as a weapon, including diverting water or preventing access to it for purposes of coercion or political pressure. Practices such as deliberate cutting off of water supplies are a form of diversion prohibited under international law, especially when they relate to specific contexts, such as if the population is completely dependent on the diverted water source or access to it, as in the case of the Alouk plant, for example. These provisions apply to all parties to the conflict, including non-state armed groups, the occupying power and government actors. The duty to respond to and meet the needs of the civilian population imposes positive obligations on the parties to the conflict to take action and measures to ensure more effective management of water resources and infrastructure.
Continued enforcement of international human rights law: It is well established in international law and practice that the provisions of international human rights law remain in force during armed conflict, and in some cases may take precedence, especially when other provisions of international humanitarian law fall short of providing more comprehensive protection. In the Syrian case, the Syrian State remains primarily responsible for ensuring the population’s access to water and must take all possible measures to ensure that they enjoy that right enshrined in numerous instruments of international human rights law. As an occupying power, Turkey bears the same responsibility in the areas under its control. The applicability of international human rights law to non-state armed groups exercising de facto authority or effective control over territory and populations is also recognized. [49] In addition to their duty to respect the right to water, states must take appropriate measures to ensure that this right is protected from interference by third parties, as well as to enforce this right. Practices or omissions in the water situation in Syria may amount to a clear violation of the three types of obligations: respect, protection and enforcement. [50]
10. Common recommendations:
Establish an impartial and independent monitoring mechanism on the Euphrates River and all transboundary water resources shared by Syria, Turkey and Iraq, whose mission would be to monitor compliance with signed agreements and the norms of international law and to support dialogue among stakeholders to reach a sustainable settlement that ensures equitable and reasonable water use.
Conduct a full assessment of water needs and sanitation networks in northeast Syria, focusing on climate change and its future impact on available water sources.
Allow the immediate and sustainable restart of the Alouk plant, neutralize all water resources from political conflicts, and ensure that all residents have equitable and non-discriminatory access to safe drinking water.
Prioritize the preservation of existing water resources and avoid their depletion, as well as the rehabilitation of their infrastructure and the start of the process of cleaning and treating all polluted water resources and rivers.
Pressure all parties, including the Syrian government and the Autonomous Administration authorities, to assume their responsibilities in providing the interventions needed in northern and eastern Syria to avoid the re-spread of epidemics such as cholera, including increasing the number of water stations.
References:
[1] United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Comment No. 15. (Right to water) – (articles 11 and 12 of the Covenant).