Statement by Civil Society Organizations and Individual Signatories Regarding the Detention of Representatives of Those Affected by Decree 66

The available facts indicate that this case followed an earlier arrest of Yasser Abbas linked to peaceful protest activities on 8 May 2026. Yasser Abbas and Ibrahim Sheikh al-Shabab were subsequently detained on 2 June 2026, then released on bail on 9 June 2026, while judicial prosecution continued and the next hearing was scheduled for 18 June 2026. Their release on bail does not alter the substance of the human rights concerns this case raises, since their detention and prosecution were used in response to legitimate criticism and public demands relating to their own rights and the rights of the affected communities they represent. This risks turning the criminal process into a tool of pressure with a deterrent effect, rather than a guarantee of fairness and the rule of law.

According to the available judicial and security documents, the complaints and allegations are based on the Cybercrime Law No. 20 of 2022, the general Penal Code, and the Demonstration Law No. 54 of 2011. The Damascus Governorate and the State Litigation Department attribute to Yasser Abbas and Ibrahim Sheikh al-Shabab acts such as “systematic incitement,” “defamation,” “spreading false news via the internet and satellite channels,” “undermining the reputation and authority of a public administration,” and “inciting riotous demonstrations.” At their core, the facts presented in the case files rest on media statements, audio recordings, Facebook posts, WhatsApp groups, public criticism of the Damascus Governorate’s statement on Decree 66, and calls for affected residents to organize and demand their rights. Based on their content, the documents do not show that the prosecution is grounded in any violent act or in a direct and imminent incitement to violence, but rather in civic and digital activity connected to demands for housing, property, and compensation rights.

The gravity of this case stems not only from a prior arrest or an ongoing criminal proceeding, but from the message it may send to those affected by Decree 66 in Mezzeh and other areas: that objecting to public policy, criticizing the Governorate’s approach, or organizing residents to claim their rights may be turned into a criminal case built on vaguely worded provisions. More broadly, the sequence of events points to a troubling pattern of restrictions on fundamental rights, beginning with the Damascus Governorate’s decision to treat the Decree 66 file as a regulatory and administrative matter rather than one tied to redress and reparation; continuing with the denial to affected residents of an effective and transparent path to claim their rights; and culminating in the detentions and prosecutions linked to peaceful assembly and public expression. These facts raise serious concerns that the arrest and detention of the affected residents’ representatives may be arbitrary, given that their deprivation of liberty appears directly tied to the exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and the pursuit of redress, rights guaranteed under the Constitutional Declaration and Syria’s international obligations, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Moreover, reliance on vaguely worded criminal provisions, especially in the Cybercrime Law and the Demonstration Law, to criminalize public criticism, civic organizing, and demands for housing, property, and compensation rights raises serious questions about whether a valid and legitimate legal basis for the detention exists at all, and about the compatibility of these provisions and their application with international standards prohibiting arbitrary detention.

Concern deepens because this trajectory cannot be separated from the broader framework of transitional justice. The transitional phase requires reviewing the laws and practices that harmed Syrians, not repurposing them against the affected communities and their representatives. The exposure of victims of violations, or their representatives, to the risk of arrest or to measures that may discourage them from claiming their legitimate rights raises serious concerns about the prospects for building a fair, inclusive, and victim-centered transitional justice in Syria. Using laws enacted under the previous era, particularly the Cybercrime Law, to prosecute public discourse on housing, property, and compensation rights reflects a worrying continuation of legal tools previously associated with restricting public freedoms, at a time when any genuine political transition is expected to put an end to the use of the previous repressive legal structure against those it harmed, and to open a clear path toward redress and reparation.

The undersigned organizations and individuals further affirm that the objection of residents affected by Decree 66 is not about neutral regulatory or administrative details, but about a legal and urban-planning model produced by the former regime in the context of widespread human rights violations, a model that reshaped property and urban space in ways that threaten the rights to housing, property, return, and redress. Decree 66 cannot be treated as a mere instrument of urban planning, as it is sometimes portrayed, since its application has been tied from the outset to areas severely damaged during the conflict and viewed by the former regime as opposition-supporting social communities. This makes its effects on housing and property part of a wider legacy of displacement and exclusion, rather than the mere outcome of neutral planning measures. Decree 66 established the Marota City and Basilia City projects in Damascus, encompassing areas of Mezzeh, Kafr Sousa, al-Qadam, Nahr Aisha, and al-Asali within the planning zone. Law No. 10 of 2018 then extended this model nationwide, opening the door to converting individual properties into shares within redevelopment projects that may, in the absence of clear rights-based safeguards, lead to unjust expropriation, inadequate compensation, and the exclusion of the displaced, refugees, and residents who lack full formal ownership documents or live in informal housing conditions. The danger of this approach does not stop at Mezzeh, Kafr Sousa, al-Qadam, Nahr Aisha, and al-Asali; it extends to the future of reconstruction in Syria, including neighborhoods such as Jobar, al-Qaboun, Tishreen, and other destroyed areas, where the same legal and regulatory approaches could become a precedent for reproducing exclusion instead of repairing harm. Any legitimate reconstruction must be built on the priority of repairing harm, restoring rights, and guaranteeing fair compensation, adequate housing, transparency, and the genuine participation of affected residents.

Urgent Demands

The undersigned organizations and individuals affirm that release on bail does not end the human rights concerns this case raises, as long as the prosecution continues and as long as this precedent can have an intimidating effect on the affected communities in Mezzeh, Jobar, al-Qaboun, Tishreen, and other areas. They further affirm that respect for rights and the repair of harm are the foundation of any fair and sustainable reconstruction, one that could transform Marota City and Basilia City from a model of exclusion and conflict into a national model for post-conflict reconstruction. The path to fair reconstruction does not begin with silencing the affected, but with recognizing their rights, guaranteeing their participation, and establishing a national path for redress and reparation that prevents the same injustices from being repeated through new or inherited legal tools. Accordingly, the undersigned organizations and individuals demand the following:

1. To ensure that criminal prosecution, detention, or the threat thereof is not used as a means of managing civil and property disputes or of restricting the peaceful pursuit of rights; to review and drop any charges based on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression or peaceful assembly, including public criticism of the policies of the Damascus Governorate, or participation in civic organizing connected to claiming the rights of those affected by Decree 66; and to ensure that such acts do not become a basis for criminal prosecution.
2. To refrain from broadening the interpretation of provisions in the Cybercrime Law, the Penal Code, and the Demonstration Law in ways that criminalize public criticism or debate relating to the public interest and to housing, property, and compensation rights; and to work toward reviewing these provisions in line with international human rights law and the requirements of the transitional phase, so as to ensure that legal tools associated with the previous era are no longer used to restrict public freedoms or silence the peaceful pursuit of rights.
3. To call on the Damascus Governorate, in cooperation with the relevant ministries and the National Commission for Transitional Justice, to adopt an integrated and transparent plan for compensation and reparation in the Decree 66 areas, prepared in genuine partnership with the communities of affected residents, and taking into account the right to property, the right to adequate housing, housing alternatives, fair compensation, and the restitution of rights wherever possible.

Signatory Organizations

1. Syrian Legal Development Programme (SLDP)
2. The Day After (TDA)
3. Association for the Repeal of Decree 66 and the Restoration of Rights
4. Mezzeh Committee
5. Riad Seif Foundation for Human Rights
6. Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM)
7. Guardians of Truth Organization
8. Women Now for Development
9. Dawlaty
10. Citizens for Syria
11. Bidayatuna Association – Syria for All
12. Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ)
13. Local Development and Small Projects Support Office (LDSPS)
14. Justice for Life (JFL)
15. Badael
16. Seen for Civil Peace
17. Bell – Civil Waves
18. Families for Freedom Association
19. Caesar Families Association
20. Coordination Committee of al-Bab City and its Suburbs
21. Kish Malek
22. Action for Sama
23. Syrian Prisons Museum
24. Campaign for Syria
25. Center for Civil Society and Democracy
26. Adalati
27. Alternative Pathways (Masarat Ibdaliya)
28. Syrian Female Journalists Network Foundation
29. Huqouqiyat (Female Jurists)
30. Lilon Association for Victims
31. Recovery (Taʿafi) Initiative
32. Families for Justice and Truth
33. Amal Center for Advocacy and Recovery
34. Workshop (Warsheh) Team
35. Novotozone
36. Human Rights Guardians
37. MDP – MADAD for Development and Peacebuilding
38. Yekpar Association for Culture, Art, and Development
39. Dozana
40. Syrian Foundation for Research and Sustainable Development
41. Baytna (Our Home)
42. Independent Humanitarian Message Organization
43. For Feminism Organization
44. Syrian Missing Families Networking
45. Adl Center for Human Rights
46. Women of Tomorrow
47. Foundation for Humanitarian and Developmental Cooperation
48. Equal Citizenship Center
49. “Volunteer to Build” Team
50. Damma Women’s Association
51. Syrian Committee for Detainees (SCD)
52. Syrian Women’s Political Movement
53. Network of Kurdish Journalists in Syria
54. Roz Organization for Support and Empowerment

Individual Signatories

1. Ziad Khayata
2. Tarek Hamdan
3. Dr. Hamza al-Khatib
4. Khouloud Helmi
5. Shatha Kilo
6. Ayman Abu Hashem
7. Jalal Kamel Nofal
8. Bushra Khudair
9. Farouk al-Habib
10. Rima Dali
11. Mariam Hallak
12. Boulos al-Hallak
13. Noura Ghazi
14. Fadwa Mahmoud
15. Mona al-Frej
16. Lubna Kanawati
17. Eng. Ibrahim Sheikh al-Shabab
18. Radwan al-Ghafir
19. Iyad Hamid
20. Mohammad Yazan Dweidari
21. Heba Brais
22. Souhail al-Ghazi
23. Amal al-Naasan
24. Khadija Hussein Halima
25. Abi Kurd Ali
26. Alaa Younes
27. Malak Shanwani
28. Thuraya Hijazi
29. Linda Othman
30. Jana Sultani
31. Hadi Madwar
32. Lana Antaki
33. Bari Abdul Latif
34. Souad Khabbiyeh
35. Youssef Bakdash
36. Khaled al-Haji
37. Mohammad Kanjo
38. Souzan Suleiman
39. Abdul Ghaffar al-Bawwab
40. Mohammad Nabhan
41. Zahra al-Frej
42. Suhair Omar
43. Iman Abdul Alyan
44. Sasha Ayoub
45. Ramez Yousfan
46. Rania Mustafa
47. Khitam Ghabash
48. Afaf al-Kojak
49. Dr. Mohammad Karimah
50. Shifaa al-Abd
51. Rasha al-Tabshi
52. Ahmad Hassan Obeid
53. Ahmad Haddad
54. Rebaz Tahsin al-Ali
55. Firas Haj Yahya
56. Abdul Khaled
57. Mohammad Abdul Latif al-Ghafir
58. Tarek Qadri
59. Rashid Ayyash
60. Mohammad Ayman Maatouk
61. Youssef al-Khatib
62. Amer Abdul Hafez Manawi
63. Mustafa al-Hammami
64. Haifa al-Ghafir
65. Abdul Razzaq al-Masri
66. Muhannad al-Ghafir
67. Bishar Hassan Hjeij
68. Ola Hassan al-Masri
69. Mohammad al-Saleem
70. Ayman Maatouk
71. Mohammad Bilal Maatouk
72. Marwan al-Esh
73. Inaam al-Ghafir
74. Safaa al-Imam Rabba
75. Fatima al-Imam
76. Ola Hassan al-Masri
77. Mohammad Mazen
78. Dr. Anas Kayyal
79. Mohammad al-Habbal
80. Alaa al-Jalda
81. Nizar Alaa al-Din
82. Mansour Dardar
83. Mahdi Abdul Aziz al-Fa
84. Mohammad Zein
85. Subhi Ahmad Baalbaki
86. Sara Ismail Abu al-Hawa
87. Omar Arabi
88. Nour Khamam
89. Bilal al-Moallem
90. Mohammad Yasser Ajaja
91. Mona Khanum
92. Nabil Mahfoud
93. Jihad Mukhtar Khamam
94. Mohammad Iyad Ajaja
95. Mohammad Fawaz Kamel
96. Jalal al-Din Hashas
97. Walid Shabib
98. Mohammad al-Qubrusli
99. Maamoun al-Ghafir
100. Lujain Yousfan
101. Mohammad Abu al-Laban
102. Maha Gharir
103. Amal al-Ghafir
104. Fawzia al-Khatib
105. Najwa Khatib
106. Mohammad Abu Karsh
107. Reham al-Marastani
108. Majed Khalaf Sheif
109. Inaam Majed Yousfan
110. Areej Majed
111. Amal Naqshbandi
112. Bilal al-Awad
113. Hassan Taqi
114. Wasel Hamida
115. Nahla Muhyi al-Din al-Homsi
116. Samar Baalbaki
117. Samer Nour al-Din
118. Mohammad Ziad Khanum
119. Fayez Abrash
120. Lawyer Mohammad Ayman Dahbour
121. Mr. Naim al-Moallem
122. Ayman Rashid Qwaider al-Moallem
123. Mohammad Ayman Qwaider
124. Samar Yassin Abbas
125. Nisreen al-Shaabi
126. Rawia al-Shammar
127. Fatima Nabki
128. Reem Abu al-Laban
129. Mohammad Firas
130. Reda Nabaa
131. Yasser al-Homsi
132. Nermin al-Abbas